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Obstacles to Tax Reform: Income Definition and Capital Gains Taxation

I. Introduction
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 sparked widespread economic anxiety among the
American public while setting the tone for the debate over economic policy to capture center
stage in the 2012 Presidential election cycle. Concern over growing budget deficits and wealth
concentration in the wake of the Recession caused much of this attention to shift onto the fiscal
policy of the United States. Public dissatisfaction with the federal income tax code remains
pervasive today, and 72 percent of Americans believe that the tax system needs either a major or
complete overhaul, according to Pew Research Center (Doherty 2013). Support for such drastic
tax reform is up from 46 percent in 2005 and dispersed across partisan and demographic groups.
Although the majority of Americans favor some sort of tax reform, there is no consensus
as to what direction or form such efforts should take. Surprisingly, only 11 percent of Americans
report being most concerned about their own personal taxes being too high. Even when
sampling is limited to those earning incomes over $100,000, just 17 percent cite personal tax
burdens as the driving factor behind their support of tax reform. Instead, the debate over tax
policy appears to be deeply rooted within individual perceptions of government: while 57
percent of respondents pointed to the prevalence of special loopholes and gimmicks for the
wealthy as their primary concern, another 28 percent were most bothered by the exceeding

Page |2

complexity of the tax code. These two foremost concerns have been construed as implicating
divergent roles for the federal government, with the former inviting government to take on a
larger role in the form of redistributive taxation and the latter emphasizing a reduction of
government’s role in economic policy as a precursor to simplifying the tax code (Doherty 2013).
Contrasting perceptions of the goals of taxation and the regulatory implications that follow have
resulted in legislative gridlock that precludes the passage of a comprehensive tax reform bill.
The taxation of capital gains features prominently in the debate over tax reform, as the
treatment of capital income simultaneously implicates questions of fairness and complexity in
the tax code. Capital gains receive preferential treatment in the form of relatively lower tax rates
under current U.S. law, a practice that primarily benefits the wealthy, who are more likely to
hold large portfolios of capital assets. Many wealthy investors realize a significant portion of
their annual earnings as capital gains, causing their overall tax rates to be lower than those facing
middle class Americans, whose incomes are often comprised entirely of wages. While the
preferential tax treatment of capital gains is not entirely without justification, for reasons we
shall discuss herein, the sentiment that the wealthy do not pay their fair share of taxes is broadly
held among the American public. This discontent was manifested into policy by the Obama
Administration through proposal of the so-called “Buffet Rule,” intended to ensure that
taxpayers earning over $1 million pay at least 30 percent of their yearly income in federal taxes,
regardless of whether the income is earned as salary or capital gains (Brundage 2012).
II. Defining Income for Tax Purposes
Thus far this paper has used the term income in the colloquial sense; however, analysis of
the taxation of capital gains requires us to first identify a workable definition of income, with
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which the present statutory treatment of capital gains, as well as proposed changes, can be
juxtaposed. The most widely referenced definition of income among Public Finance economists
is the Haig-Simons comprehensive definition, which measures the change in an individual’s
power to consume during the year (Gruber 2005, pg. 498). Specifically, the Haig-Simons
definition considers an individual’s income to be the sum of wages, salaries, privately earned
profits, dividends and interest receipts, transfer payments and employee benefits, gifts or
inheritances received, the value of free or subsidized services consumed and the net increase in
the real value of assets. The last item is of particular importance because it calls for capital gains
to be taxed each year as they accrue, instead of being taxed once when capital assets are sold, as
current U.S. law provides. Furthermore, the Haig-Simons definition taxes appreciation of capital
assets adjusted for inflation, unlike the U.S. tax code. These discrepancies represent the most
substantial deviation away from the Haig-Simons definition in the taxation of capital gains,
leading to both practical complications and efficiency implications in the enforcement of the tax.
The practice of levying taxes on the real increase in value of capital assets is derived from
the basic concept of income endorsed by Haig-Simons: annual income is the value of what a
taxpayer could afford to consume in a given year, while holding wealth constant. This principle
is best illustrated through an example. Suppose that at the beginning of the year Sally owns $100
worth of corporate stock, which appreciates in value to $250 by the end of the year. During the
same time period, she earns a salary of $1,000 working at her full-time job, in addition to
receiving health insurance benefits worth $500 from her employer. Of her $1,000 salary, $700 is
spent consuming goods and services throughout the course of the year, and the remaining $300 is
invested in U.S. Treasury bonds. Sally’s taxable income under the Haig-Simons definition
would be $1,650, consisting of $1,000 in salary, $150 in accrued capital gains and $500 in
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employer provided health benefits. The value of her portfolio’s appreciation is included in her
taxable income, because she could conceivably sell 60 percent of her stock holdings at the end of
the year and still maintain the $100 in wealth she started the year with. Similarly, if Sally had
seen her stock depreciate in value, she would be able to deduct the full amount of the year’s
capital losses from her taxable income (Ibid.). This is unlike the American system, which places
limits the deductibility of capital losses to prevent tax avoidance through deceptive write-offs.
Under the Haig-Simons definition, taxable income is equated to potential consumption,
as opposed to actual consumption, and as a result this system of taxation is often viewed as
providing a measure of an individual’s ability-to-pay. When evaluated under horizontal and
vertical equity criteria, the inclusion of previously nontaxed earnings under Haig-Simons appears
to improve tax fairness, a feature valued highly by many Americans. If two taxpayers earn equal
salaries, but only one of them receives additional health benefits, then including those benefits in
the definition of taxable income increases the taxable income and eventual tax burden of the
recipient. This modification improves vertical equity, because the taxpayer who receives health
benefits on top of his salary, and is thus better off in real terms, indeed pays higher taxes. If, on
the other hand, two taxpayers receive an equal dollar amount of compensation from their
employer, but one of them receives half of her total compensation in the form of health benefits,
then the elimination of tax exempt status for health benefits imposes identical tax burdens on
taxpayers in identical circumstances. This feature improves the horizontal equity of taxation,
because taxpayers with equal welfare from earning income pay identical taxes, regardless of the
income’s composition (Ibid.).
The Haig-Simons definition of taxable income is not foolproof, however, as there are
circumstances which engender disconnects between one’s potential to consume goods and one’s

Page |5

ability to pay taxes. When two taxpayers earn identical incomes, regardless of the nature or
amount of actual consumption, Haig-Simons levies identical tax burdens upon each of them
because the circumstances facing the two citizens appear identical. However, in the event that a
citizen is forced to spend half his income repairing fire damage in his home, his tax burden will
be the same as if he had spent half of his income buying a boat. Thus, while it may be
administratively expedient to lump all of a taxpayer’s consumption, savings and asset
appreciation into the tax base, potential consumption is an unreliable proxy for taxpayer welfare.
Moreover, the taxation of inflation adjusted capital gains on accrual would require taxpayers to
have their capital assets valuated annually. While this may be a fairly straightforward process
with corporate stocks, whose value is constantly updated and readily available, being required to
obtain and submit an expert’s opinion on the value of a rare painting every year would introduce
another layer of complexity and administrative difficulty into the tax code. Taxpayers may even
be forced to sell inherited capital assets, such as a vacation property, in order to meet their annual
tax obligations if capital gains are taxed on accrual.
In addition to concerns of fairness at the individual level and complexity at the
administrative level, many economists cite more far-reaching economic implications to
rationalize statutory deviations from the Haig-Simons concept of taxable income. Fisher (1937),
for example, argues that the best measure of income for tax purposes is actual consumption, and
that capital gains should be tax exempt to avoid double taxation. Fisher reasons that since
income earned in a given time period is either consumed during that same period or saved and
consumed later, a tax levied on consumption will ultimately reach all of an individual’s income
while adhering to the criteria for lifetime horizontal equity. This is because capital gains
represent a present accounting for growth in a future stream of income, so taxing capital income
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once upon realization and again upon consumption carries the potential to impose inconsistent
tax burdens on citizens with identical lifetime incomes, depending on their savings preferences.
To illustrate this inherent ambiguity in the tax code, Fisher presents an example of three brothers
each inheriting a $100,000 fortune, but investing it differently. Fisher shows that although each
brother’s inheritance is invested at five percent and taxed at one percent, the capital gains tax
over-taxes long-term savings and under-taxes immediate consumption, reducing the inventive to
save and potentially undermining the neoclassical engine of growth (Fisher 1937, pg. 48).
Although Fisher’s proposed consumption tax is at odds both with the Haig-Simons definition of
income and the actual tax system employed by the United States, he does concede that taxation
of capital gains would run less afoul of horizontal equity principles if capital income was taxed
on accrual, as is the case under a pure Haig-Simons system (Ibid.).
III. Historical Treatment of Capital Gains
In practice, taxation of capital gains has long walked a middle ground between the works
of Irving Fisher and the conceptual definition of income promoted by Robert Haig and Henry
Simons. Although capital gains are included in the base of taxable income à la Haig-Simons,
capital gains have historically received preferential tax treatment which reduces the tax liability
of capital income relative to ordinary income. In this section, we discuss the current state of
capital gains taxation while providing the tax code with historical context. The paper then
proceeds to a discussion of the arguments in favor of special tax treatment for capital gains.
An investor experiences a capital gain when a capital asset is sold for a price greater than
that which the investor paid for it (referred to as its “basis”). Capital assets are pieces of
property that act as a store of value, ranging from corporate stock and privately owned
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businesses to land, art and collectibles (Burman and Rosenberg). Under current U.S. law,
owners of capital assets pay no tax while maintaining ownership rights over the property, and the
total appreciation in the value of the asset is taxed when the asset is sold. As a result, citizens
can legally avoid paying taxes on appreciated capital assets by simply choosing not to sell them.
This creates a lock-in effect where capital becomes illiquid and the flow of capital throughout the
economy slows down. Mitigating this lock-in effect is one argument for taxing capital gains at
lower rates than ordinary income, assuming that gains are to be taxes upon realization (Auten
and Cordes, pg. 10).
Ratification of the 16th Amendment to the Constitution granted Congress the authority to
levy an income tax on the general public, and the Revenue Act of 1913 provided the legislative
means through which Congress could exercise this new power. The Revenue Act provides that,
in addition to including standard items like wages, salaries and the like, “the net income of a
taxable person shall include...gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever”
(Revenue Act of 1913, pg. 167). Pursuant to this statutory definition, capital gains were taxed at
the same rate as ordinary income from 1913 to 1921, until concerns over tax revenues falling in
response to the rate hikes of World War I induced lawmakers to institute preferential tax
treatment for capital income (Auten pg. 58). The extent of this preferred treatment was initially
to allow wealthy taxpayers to select an alternate 12.5 percent rate on assets held for longer than
two years. Then, in 1934, special treatment of capital gains intensified as Congress allowed
taxpayers to exclude from their taxable income a portion of capital gains commensurate with the
length of an asset’s holding period. Exclusion rates ranged from 20 percent on assets held for
one year to 70 percent on assets held for 10 or more years, until 1942, when Congress simplified
this rate structure by allowing taxpayers to exclude half of capital gains on assets held for more
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than six months. Congress experimented with different minimum rates and exclusion allowances
for the next 35 years, causing the maximum real tax rate on capital gains to fluctuate between 40
and 50 percent (Ibid.). Exclusion rates settled at 60 percent and remained there between 1978
and 1986, with the remaining 40 percent of long-term capital gains subject to ordinary tax rates.
Some economists argue that this is a much simpler mechanism for conveying tax preference to
capital gains.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the tax preference to capital gains, as taxpayers
were no longer able to exclude portions of capital gains from taxable income. Under the new tax
laws, 100 percent of capital gains were subject to taxation, and at the same 28 percent rate as
ordinary income. Preferred treatment of capital gains was restored in 1993, as the top marginal
tax rate on ordinary income was increased to 39 percent, while the capital gains rate was cut to
20 percent. Under the Bush administration the top capital gains rate was further cut to 15
percent, though this provision expired in 2013. As of 2015, the top tax rate on the long-term
capital income of wealthy taxpayers stands at 20 percent, while a rate of 15 percent is assessed to
taxpayers whose ordinary income ranges between $37,450 and $413,200 (Spiegelman 2015).
Taxpayers with ordinary incomes below this specified interval pay no taxes on capital gains.
IV. Arguments for Preferential Tax Treatment
Assuming that capital gains ought to be included in taxable income, as is the case under
both the Haig-Simons definition and current U.S. tax law, the question of how capital gains
should be taxed arises. As mentioned previously, capital gains have received favorable tax
treatment throughout much of the nation’s history with an income tax. Proponents of imposing
relatively lower tax rates on capital income frequently advance four arguments in justification.
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First, the fact that capital gains are taxed upon realization creates a lock-in effect that distorts the
flow of capital in financial markets. Second, taxation of capital gains on a nominal basis
punishes investors for inflation and diminishes the real value of capital returns. Third, capital
gains taxation discourages investment and entrepreneurship, inhibiting economic growth.
Fourth, taxing capital gains results in the double taxation of expected future income, while
altering the incentive to save, creating an efficiency loss. We will address each of these
arguments in turn, as well as some common objections to these arguments made by opponents of
giving preferential tax treatment to capital gains (Gruber 2005, pg. 641).
The lock-in effect of capital gains taxation follows as a direct consequence from a
deviation in the U.S. tax code away from the Haig-Simons definition of taxable income. Recall
that taxes on capital gains would be collected annually under a pure Haig-Simons tax, based on
the change in the real assessment value of the taxpayer’s capital assets over the previous year.
As highlighted previously, such a taxation scheme would be difficult to enforce given the
number and frequency of asset valuations that would need to be performed. Thus, the United
States has always taxed capital gains upon realization, with markets dictating both the sale price
and the nominal amount of the gain. Owners of capital assets can therefore easily avoid paying
taxes by simply choosing not to sell assets. Even when the taxpayer dies, the accumulated
growth in his or her capital assets will in effect not be taxed, since the inheritor’s basis price on
an asset is “stepped-up” to be equal to the market price on the day of the inheritance.
For example, suppose that Bill buys stock in a company in 1960 for $10 per share. By
the time Bill passes on in 2015, the company’s stock has ballooned in value to $1,000 per share.
Bill’s daughter, Maria, inherits the stock and sells her late father’s shares the next day for $1,000
each. Mario pays no capital gains tax on the capital assets originally owned by Bill, because her
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basis price is considered to be the going price of $1,000 per share in 2015, when she acquired the
asset. If Maria had waited one year to sell her father’s stock, at which time the company was
valued at $1,050 per share, then she would pay taxes on the $50 per share increase over her
stepped-up basis. But the government misses out on the opportunity to collect capital gains taxes
on the increase in value from 1960 to 2015, since the tax can be indefinitely avoided by the
original owner as long as the asset is held. Proponents of keeping the capital gains tax rate low
argue that relatively high rates on capital gains exacerbate this lock-in effect and cost the
government significant amounts of revenue from capital income1. In addition to falling tax
revenues from capital gains, the lock-in effect can also dissuade investors from liquidating less
productive assets and reinvesting the funds into more productive assets, reducing the flow of
capital throughout the economy and slowing economic growth (Gruber 2005 pg. 641).
A second major tax implication that follows directly from deviations away from the
Haig-Simons definition of income is that capital gains are currently taxed on a nominal basis. In
other words, the tax payed by an investor on a capital asset does not allow the taxpayer to deduct
from his or her taxable gain the illusory appreciation caused by increases in the overall price
level. Let us consider this issue through another example. Suppose that Bill’s childhood friend
Alfred also buys stock for $10 per share in 1960, but in a different company. Alfred’s
investment does not perform quite as well as Bill’s, rising in value to just $20 per share by 2015
as compared to Bill’s $1,000 stock. Although his investment has doubled in nominal terms, the
overall price level throughout the economy has certainly more than doubled; meaning that the
money Alfred spent buying the shares in 1960 was worth more in terms of purchasing power

1

U.S. Treasury data on realized capital gains, tax receipts and average effective tax rates is included as an appendix
to this paper. These data appear to show that investors temporarily realize more capital gains in the years directly
following a reduction in capital gains tax rates.
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than the money he would receive from selling his shares in 2015. Under current U.S. law, Alfred
would still be required to pay taxes on his “gains”, even though his assets have actually lost
value (Gruber 2005 pg. 641). Some economists argue that tax rates on capital gains should be
kept low because a large portion of capital gains is attributable to inflation. On the other hand, it
would be more simple and direct to adjust capital gains for inflation using the Consumer Price
Index, which would bring the U.S. system closer in line with the principles of Haig-Simons.
Nonetheless, opponents of giving special treatment to capital gains point out that other sources of
income such as interest payments from bonds are more sensitive to inflation risk than capital
gains, yet are still taxed on a nominal basis. Giving taxpayers advantageous treatment for certain
types of financial investments may distort the flow of savings and direct capital towards riskier
investments like corporate stock, while encouraging fraudulent tax filing to exploit lower rates.
Supply-Side economists argue that taxation of capital gains reduces the incentive to
invest and take risks, leading to reduced capital formation and slower economic growth.
Intuitively, it may seem reasonable that this disincentive could be lessened by lowering tax rates,
since investors will have to hedge a smaller portion of their expected return against taxes. This is
similar to the process by which a lender hedges herself against inflation, where the real rate of
interest can be decomposed into the desired rate of interest plus the expected rate of inflation. In
order to achieve a desired rate of return on the ownership of a capital asset, the investor must
account for the expected amount of a capital gains tax. An investment that is expected to
generate a seven percent return over 10 years may not be as profitable when inflation and capital
gains taxes are accounted for, and the investor will be required to either seek out assets with
higher expected returns or accept a smaller payout. Both scenarios limit the number of
acceptable transactions available to the investor, potentially restricting the flow of capital as

P a g e | 12

investors stay “locked-in” holding relatively less productive assets (Auten and Cordes, pg. 10).
Taxation of certain capital assets can also be said to constitute the double taxation of
business profits, and several prominent tax reform proposals call for total elimination of
individual capital gains taxes in order to prevent tax evasion and ameliorate losses in efficiency.
Consider for example the set of reform plans broadly known as the “flat tax,” originally
conceived by Milton Friedman and formalized by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka. Under a
Hall-Rabushka flat tax, personal income earned from wages and salaries is broadly taxed at a
single “flat” rate, while capital gains are implicitly taxed as a component of business profits. The
intent of this proposal is to extract taxes from business profits before they are paid out to
investors as capital income. In this case, the argument for ending double taxation relies on the
assumption that privately owned shares in a company appreciate in response to an increase in
expected future profits. Since stock prices are in large part determined by dividend payouts,
which are themselves dependent on business profits, taxing capital gains earned from the sale of
corporate stock targets the same stream of expected future income as the taxes levied directly on
business profits. Hall and Rabushka (1983) argues that taxing these gains at the corporate level,
instead of at the individual level, provides fewer opportunities for “leakages” in the tax base,
improving compliance and increasing federal revenues (Hall and Rabushka pg. 14).
Cries of double taxation as justification for taxing capital gains at lower rates appear most
relevant to income earned from the sale corporate stocks, which occasionally has already been
subject to taxation at the corporate level. However, the capital gains tax encompasses a much
wider variety of assets than the sort considered in Hall and Rabushka (1983), and it is more
difficult to make the case that paying taxes on the sale of antiques or art also represents a form of
double taxation. Furthermore, the Tax Policy Center estimates that roughly half of all corporate
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profits are never taxed at the corporate level due to exemptions and loopholes, which implies that
taxing capital gains at a lower rate may only offset corporate taxation in a minority of cases
(Burman and Rosenberg, pg. 7). As to whether capital gains taxation inhibits economic growth,
Cassou and Lansing (2003) predicts that tax reform plans which eliminate the double taxation of
capital income may not be beneficial to the economy, because higher tax rates elsewhere will be
required to make up for the lost government revenue. These findings call into question the
efficiency arguments against double taxation, while undermining the case for allowing capital
gains to receive special treatment under tax laws.
V. Who Benefits from Lower Capital Gains Taxes?
Opponents of allowing preferential tax treatment for capital gains point out that the
taxation of capital gains is highly progressive, and that any attempt to reduce the tax liabilities of
citizens reporting capital income typically results in windfall gains for the wealthiest Americans.
Examination of tax data for recent years appears to corroborate this claim, as the Tax Policy
Center reports that taxpayers earning over $200,000 per year enjoyed 94 percent of the benefits
derived from taxing capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income. This concentration of
gains is even more heavily concentrated at the extreme top of the distribution, as three-quarters
of the gains reported by the Tax Policy Center went to taxpayers with incomes over $1 million
(Burman and Rosenberg, pg. 8). The 2013 Economic Report to the President notes that 41
percent of all capital gains realized during the year were claimed by the richest 0.1 percent of
taxpayers (Krueger, Abraham and Stock).
Although it is clear that the wealthiest Americans own the lion’s share of capital assets
and earn the vast majority of capital gains, improving progressivity in the taxation of capital
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gains is not as simple as ensuring that taxes rates are kept reasonably high. The unusual
circumstances of capital gains taxation prevents policymakers from relying on rate increases as a
means of generating more revenues, because capital gains taxes are so easily avoided. While
there is evidence to suggest that capital gains realization, and perhaps government revenue,
increases in response to a reduction in tax rates, these benefits appear to be only temporary and
to disproportionately accrue to the wealthy. It is indeed surprising that most of the recent debate
surrounding capital gains taxation has concerned the alteration of tax rates and the tweaking of
certain exemptions, as opposed to overhauling the entire structure of tax assessment and
collection (Auerbach 1983). Yet, for all the redistributive woes of the current tax code, there
does not appear to be a single set of satisfactory policy solutions. Moving the U.S. tax code
closer in line with the Haig-Simons definition of income may improve horizontal and vertical
equity, but such a shift would introduce massive administrative costs. A viable solution may be
to transition into an accrued taxation system for those capital assets whose values are constantly
updated and readily available, such as corporate stocks, although the overall effects of this
change are uncertain. If there is one thing that the current tax treatment of capital gains should
teach American lawmakers, it is that carving out preferential treatment for certain classes of
financial assets and instruments opens up a Pandora’s Box of incentives and distortions that
creates new and complicated policy problems.
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VI. Appendix (source: Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis)
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